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Under sections which are virtually identical in all the securities
acts, the Securities and Exchange Commission is empowered to conduct
investigations.' The powers granted are quite sweeping. A typical
section of the statutes reads as follows:
(a) The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investi-
gations as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has
violated or is about to violate any provision of this title or any
rule or regulation thereunder, and may require or permit any
person to file with it a statement in writing, under oath or other-
wise as the Commission shall determine, as to all the facts and
circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated. The Com-
mission is authorized, in its discretion, to publish information
concerning any such violations, and to investigate any facts, condi-
tions, practices, or matters which it may deem necessary or proper
to aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this title, in the
prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in securing in-
formation to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation
concerning the matters to which this tidie relates.
(b) For the purpose of any such investigation, or any other
proceeding under this title, any member of the Commission or any
officer designated by it is empowered to administer oaths and affir-
mations, subpena witnesses, compel their attendance, take
evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, cor-
respondence, memoranda, or other records which the Commission
deems relevant or material to the inquiry. Such attendance of
witnesses and the production of any such records may be required
from any place in the United States or any State at any designated
place of hearing.2
* Member, New York Bar. A.B., Harvard University, 1957; LL.B., Harvard University,
1961. The author wishes to thank Fern Lowenfels, Seymour B. Goldfeld, Esq., David L.
Marks, Esq., Leslie Susser, Esq., and Roger Alan Tolins, Esq. for their helpful suggestions
with respect to this article.
1 Securities Act of 1933, §§ 19(b) & 20(a), 48 Stat. 85, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(b)
& 77t(a) (1964); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 21(a) & (b), 48 Stat. 899, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(a) & (b) (1964); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 18, 49 Stat. 831,
15 U.S.C. § 79r (1964); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 321(a), 53 Stat. 1174, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77uuu(a) (1964); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 42, 54 Stat. 842, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-41 (1964); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209, 54 Stat. 853, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9
(1964).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a) & (b), 48 Stat. 899, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a) &
(b) (1964).
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As will be seen, the very initiation of an investigation by the Com-
mission under the securities acts is a substantial sanction upon the in-
vestigatee. The ordeal of an investigation often leaves the investigatee
seriously drained, financially as well as emotionally, with a reputation
severely tarnished. Yet the entire set of Rules of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission Relating to Investigations covers less than two 8 inch
by 10 inch pages and barely mentions any rights granted to the
investigatee.3 Moreover, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act4
contains virtually nothing which protects the private party at the
investigatory level.
It is the thesis of this article that the substantial investigative
powers granted to the Commission are subject to abuse; that there is too
little protection for the investigatee at the investigatory level. The fol-
lowing sections will attempt to delineate some of the more serious
problems which exist under present SEC investigatory practices and
also suggest possible changes in Commission procedures which would
mitigate some of the more serious abuses.
THE INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION
There are no standards with respect to the initiation of investiga-
tions, no uniformity with regard to who is investigated and who is not
investigated. When one realizes that the investigation is itself a serious
sanction, this lack of uniform standards exposes the entire process to
serious abuse. A staff member in one of the Commission's investigative
branches has advised the author that one of the fifteen branches in the
SEC's Division of Corporation Finance is responsible for initiating
approximately one-third of the 1933 Act investigations. Obviously, if a
registration statement is assigned to this particular branch for pro-
cessing, its chances of being subjected to the investigatory process are
substantially enhanced. And an SEC investigation, with the endless
delay and insidious generating of rumors, can literally drive a young
fledgling company to bankruptcy.
When a staff member of the SEC determines that an investigation
should be initiated, a report is written, occasionally but not uniformly,
reviewed by a senior staff member, and then presented to the Commis-
sion itself.5 The Commission may reject the report, request more
information before making a decision, or issue an order initiating the
3 17 C.F.R. § 203 (1970).
460 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (Supp. V, 1970).
5There is a separation of functions at the Securities and Exchange Commission
between the staff, which conducts the day to day work of the agency, and the Commission
itself which functions more in a quasi-judicial and policy-making fashion.
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investigation. This process, while not objectionable in theory, has in
practice become largely a rubber stamp. If a staff member feels strongly
enough to recommend an investigation, the Commission is inclined to
concur.6 As a rule, the staff member who recommended the investiga-
tion is then given the power to try to prove his case. He becomes in
effect a prosecuting attorney with great powers to examine the investi-
gatee's files, issue subpoenas and depose witnesses. And he has the full
power of the United States Government behind him. The investigatee
may have done nothing wrong, not a single violation of the securities
acts may exist, but the hunch of a staff member and the rubber stamp
approval of a hierarchy largely ignorant at this early stage of any rele-
vant facts, is sufficient to initiate the investigation.
The order of the Commission commencing the investigation com-
pounds the burden upon the investigatee. This order is invariably
sweeping in nature, granting the staff carte blanche with respect to the
investigatee's affairs. This means that if the original hunch of a viola-
tion is not easily substantiated the investigator can fish around almost
interminably until something is found which will justify the entire
exercise.
THE CONDUCT OF TiH INVESTIGATION
Once an investigation has been ordered, one of the first steps is
usually the serving of subpoenas by the staff. This insures that the
investigation, which is supposed to be conducted privately, immediately
becomes public knowledge.7 The rumor mill then begins to grind. Soon
virtually everybody who is important to a company or its principals
- its creditors, its bankers, its suppliers, its customers, its stockholders -
is aware that an SEC investigation is pending. If the press inquires of
the Commission or the staff as to what is happening, invariably a "no
comment" is forthcoming. This response merely lends fuel to the fire.
Concomitant with the service of subpoenas on third parties is the
assembling of the voluminous documents required by the staff from the
investigatee itself. Sophisticated legal counsel must be retained to ex-
amine these documents before they are handed over to the Govern-
ment. Often other experts, such as accountants or engineers, must be
consulted in connection with the assembling of these materials. The
6A staff member in one of the SEC's investigative branches recently stated to the
author that he could recall only one instance where the Commission refused to approve
a staff member's recommendation for an investigation.
7 Rule 5 of the Rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission Relating to In-
vestigations states that, "[u]nless otherwise ordered by the Commission, all formal inves-
tigative proceedings shall be non-public." 17 C.F.R. § 203.5 (1970).
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diversion of the principal executives from their daily responsibilities,
the substantial professional fees required to be paid, the costs involved
in assembling and reproducing documents are a serious and costly bur-
den upon all but the largest and most solvent of companies. Moreover,
the subpoenas, like the order of investigation, are sweeping and often
encompass almost all of the investigatee's files. Thus the furnishing of
documents by the investigatee for examination by the staff can be an
endless task.
After examining documents supplied by the investigatee and by
third parties, and perhaps after a visit to the offices of the company for
a further perusal of files, the investigator will move on to the deposition
stage. Meanwhile, the delay is becoming intolerable to the investigatee.
If the investigation is bottomed on the Securities Act of 19338 and con-
cerns disclosure under a pending registration statement, the entire
financing is held in abeyance pending the conclusion of the investiga-
.tion. Thus a small company finds itself under increasing pressure to
look elsewhere for funds. However, since any proposed source of financ-
ing must be told of the pending investigation, alternative sources tend
to evaporate. If the investigation is bottomed on the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19349 and concerns an investment banker, companies
tend to look elsewhere for funds and customers seek other financial
advisors. The financial community is inclined to avoid a broker-dealer
subject to an existing SEC investigation. Meetings with the staff are
held in an attempt to expedite matters. These meetings, however, must
be held with the staff people conducting the investigation who are ac-
tually in an adversary position vis-h-vis the investigatee. Thus, while
they may be sympathetic to the investigatee's plight, they are primarily
concerned with developing their own case and justifying the raison
d'9tre of their investigation.
Once in the deposition stage the costs and burdens on the investi-
gatee continue to mount. Lawyers are required to represent the investi-
gatee and its principals at these depositions.10 Outside parties are de-
posed, reinforcing the adverse publicity and ugly rumors swirling about
the company. More often than not the investigatee has other problems
- this is what may have attracted the SEC investigation in the first
place - and these problems become aggravated by the continuing SEC
probe. The psychological burden on the principals involved becomes
8 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bb (1964).
948 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964).
10 See Rule 7 of the Rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission Relating to
Investigations, 17 C.F.R. § 203.7 (1970).
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unbearable. Entities only tangentially related to the primary investi-
gatee are affected. Indeed, it is not uncommon for other companies in
registration having some relation to the primary investigatee to be de-
layed pending the outcome of the latter's probe.
As the depositions drag on, more documents and more information
are requested by the staff. The investigatee continues to cooperate,
hoping for some resolution to what seems an interminable bureaucratic
morass. Ultimately, upon completion of the depositions, the staff will
attempt to analyze the evidence and devise an appropriate remedy or
sanction. At this stage, however, the staff becomes singularly non-com-
municative. The investigatee is left in complete ignorance as regards
its fate. And this stage of the proceedings alone may take many addi-
tional months. Testimony and documents are reviewed by senior staff
members, conferences are held among different members of the staff,
summaries of the case are prepared and recommendations made for
Commission action. Then, after months of non-communication be-
tween investigator and investigatee, the latter may suddenly find that
an administrative action has been initiated against it, that a civil com-
plaint has been filed in the appropriate federal court or that the entire
matter has been referred to the Department of Justice for possible
criminal action. Often the investigatee has no prior warning of such
action and no opportunity to refute the staff's position before irrepar-
able harm to business and reputation occurs."
CRITIQUE
Perhaps the most serious failing of SEC investigations is the lack of
stated procedures or guidelines for the staff and the Commission to fol-
low in conducting investigations. Once an administrative hearing is
commenced, an elaborate panoply of rules, many of which are specifi-
cally designed to protect the private person's rights, become applica-
ble.12 If the defendant after an administrative hearing determines to
seek judicial review, another set of rules and procedures exist.13 If a
civil complaint is filed by the Commission, or if criminal proceedings
are initiated, here again the private party's rights are carefully pro-
tected. The investigatory stage, however, is much more free-wheeling.
The rights of the investigatee are not protected by written rules and
11 For a very interesting article discussing this problem see Freeman, Administrative
Procedures, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw.
891 (1967).
12 See Rules of Practice of the Seturities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 201
(1970).
13 See Federal Administrative Procedure Act §§ 10-15, 80 Stat. 892 (1966), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-06 (Supp. V, 1970).
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regulations as much as by the good judgment, discretion, innate de-
cency and fairness of the staff members conducting the investigation.
Thus the rights of the investigatee may vary substantially depending
upon who the particular investigators are. Moreover, by virtue of cir-
cumstances the investigator becomes more and more of an adversary
trying to ferret out the information necessary to prove his case. It is a
difficult, if not impossible, task to be concomitantly concerned with all
the protections which the investigatee's position demands.
It is submitted that many of the problems described above could
be eliminated if each investigation were assigned to a specific indepen-
dent supervisor for his oversight. A small group of such independent
supervisors could be created from the Commission's existing staff. The
Commission is careful to separate the role of the advocate and the role
of the judge at the administrative hearing level - why not bring some
of these protections down to the investigatory level? Each Commission
order initiating an investigation could assign the supervision of the in-
vestigation to an independent supervisor having no prior acquaintance
with the facts or the parties involved. The next step might be a con-
ference between the investigators and the investigatee with the indepen-
dent supervisor presiding. Here such problems as submission of volu-
minous documents, service of subpoenas on sensitive third parties,
specific information required by the investigators, could be resolved.
And both investigator and investigatee would be subject to the pre-
liminary rulings of an independent supervisor functioning as a judge
at a conference in chambers.
As the investigation continues, the supervisor would be responsible
for preventing inordinate delays or dilatory tactics by either side. If the
staff's original suspicions with respect to violations are clearly refuted
by the evidence at an early stage, the supervisor would be empowered
to recommend to the Commission that the investigation be terminated.
This would free the busy staff for other duties, would save the tax-
payers' money, and might spell the difference between survival and
bankruptcy for the investigatee. Moreover, the supervisor could be em-
powered to sever the affairs of tangentially related third parties from
the primary investigation thereby possibly freeing other registration
statements for ordinary processing and clearance. At the deposition
stage the supervisor would be available to rule on questions of privi-
lege, admission of questionable documents and relevancy of examina-
tion.
After the depositions are completed, the supervisor would move
quickly to have the staff assemble all the evidence and render a report
[Vol. 45:575
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together with a recommendation as to what action should be taken. The
investigatee should then be called in, given a copy of the staff's report
and recommendation, and an opportunity to present its side of the case
together with a proposed remedy. This would not only eliminate the
nerve-wracking secrecy and silence which often follows the termination
of the deposition stage, but would give investigator and investigatee
under the aegis of an independent supervisor an opportunity to devise
a more appropriate and imaginative remedy or sanction t han might
otherwise be possible.14
As regards the pre-investigatory stage, the Commission should issue
some sort of informal guidelines to the staff with respect to recommend-
ing the initiation of investigations which would make the entire process
more even-handed and predictable. The Commission should then pro-
ceed to implement these guidelines with a more careful examination of
each recommendation submitted by the staff. The investigation itself
is too burdensome and costly to both investigator and investigatee to
warrant only rubber stamp treatment by the Commission at the stage of
initiation. Finally, the order of investigation should be sufficiently
broad to allow appropriate inquiries, but sufficiently narrow to prevent
a limited investigation from turning into an inquisitorial fishing ex-
pedition.
The use of independent supervisors who would develop experience
and expertise in the investigatory area to oversee investigations would
have a number of additional salutary effects. One immediate result
would be the centralization of interim decision-making with respect to
each particular investigation. The investigatee would no longer find
itself shifted from official to official, from branch to branch, in an at-
tempt to get a progress report or an interim ruling. The "buck" with
respect to a particular investigation would stop at a particular super-
visor's desk. The use of an independent supervisor would also tend to
eliminate a certain amount of the influence peddling and exploitation
of personal relationships between outside counsel and staff members
which inevitably becomes the bane of any government bureaucracy.
When the deposition stage of an investigation has been completed and
the veil of secrecy descends, enormous pressure builds up from clients
to find out just what is happening. When the staff members directly
concerned with a particular investigation become completely non-com-
municative, other sources of information are sought. A client's Con-
gressman or Senator may be prevailed upon to seek a progress report,
14 See Freeman, supra note 11.
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or counsel may attempt to contact an old friend on the staff having
nothing whatever to do with the investigation in an effort to glean in-
formation. These are not the kinds of practices which the Commission's
procedures should encourage. If the investigatee has a legitimate need
for an interim progress report, a conference between investigator and
investigatee in the presence of the independent supervisor would be a
much healthier way of dealing with the problem. Finally, focusing re-
sponsibility for the conduct of an investigation would help to ensure
that the investigatee does not get caught between the competing jeal-
ousies of different branches of the bureaucracy. Often one staff member
will tend to focus on one area of inquiry and inform the investigatee
that material dealing with other areas of the business may be safely ig-
nored. A short time later another staff member from a different branch
of the Commission, also empowered to implement the Commission's
investigative mandate, may countermand the previous instructions and
request the submission of reams of additional materials previously
excluded. The effects upon the investigatee are additional burdens and
expenses, as well as disillusionment with the justice and propriety of
the entire exercise. And one must never forget that in the case of a pub-
lic company it is the public stockholders' equity that is bearing the
costs of the Commission's investigation.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the changes in Commission pro-
cedures suggested in this article could be easily implemented. The
Commission already has a sufficient staff from which a small group of in-
dependent supervisors to oversee investigations could be chosen. The
creation of such a group would help bring the judicial fact-finding ap-
proach, which hopefully exists at the administrative hearing level, down
to the investigatory level. Also, informal guidelines dealing with initi-
ation of investigations, more searching Commission review of staff rec-
ommendations, and more carefully worded orders of investigation
should not be difficult to implement. And the results might go a long
way toward giving the investigatee the due process of law that its posi-
tion demands.
